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Deficits and Monetary Growth 
For a decade or more, the United States has 
experienced persistingly large federal deficits 
-and persistingly high rates of monetary 
growth. The data presented in this Weekly 
Letter show that the high monetary-growth 
rates were attributable to factors controlled 
by the U.S. monetary authorities. 
Accelerated monetary growth relative to real 
output growth accompanied the rising trend 
of budget deficits in the 1960s and especially 
the 1970s, as can be seen from the rising 
trend of  the peak-to-peak cycle averages over 
that period (see charts). Earlier, deficits during 
cycl  ical contractions had largely been offset 
by surpluses during expansions. It should be 
noted that monetary growth has tended to be 
lower during contractions than expansions-
just the opposite of  the cyclical variation in 
the deficit. That observation has recently led 
some economists to deny any strong associa-
tion between deficits and monetary growth in 
the post-World War" period. The charts indi-
cate thatthey've missed the big picture, how-
ever, insofar as both monetary growth and 
deficits were high in the 1970s. 
Sources of monetary growth 
We can better understand the reasons for the 
increased monetary growth of  the 1970s by 
decomposing that aggregate into its compo-
nents. By definition, M-1 B equals a money 
multiplier times the monetary base; and the 
latter equals the sum of  a noncontrolled and a 
controlled component. The noncontrolled 
part equals the amount accountable to such 
factors as Federal Reserve discounts and ad-
vances, Federal Reserve float, and other Fed-
eral Reserve assets net of holdings of govern-
ment securities and liabilities. The controlled 
part consists of  two elem~nts. One is fiat 
money-the amount of  the monetary base 
that results from Federal Reserve purchases of 
government securities plus the Treasury's is-
suance of currency and coin (net of  Treasury 
holdings ofdeposits and currency). The other 
element is the required-reserve adjustment, 
which is the change in the monetary base 
needed to offset changes in required-reserve 
ratios as set by Federal Reserve regulations. 
Thus changes in the quantity of  money can be 
attributed to (1) changes in the noncontrolled 
and controlled amounts of  the monetary base 
for a given multiplier, (2) changes in the 
money multiplier for a given amount of  the 
monetary base, and (3) the interaction be-
tween changes in the multiplier and changes 
in the monetary base. Altogether, changes in 
the monetary base more than accounted for 
changes in money in 1980 and in the 1970-
80 decade as a whole (see table). Further, 
most of  the increase in the monetary base 
came from controlled sources, although 
noncontrolled sources also played a part. 
Money multiplier and base effects 
The money multiplier declined both in 1980 
and over the 1970-80 period as a whole. This 
decline reflected the decade's sharp rise in 
interest rates, which induced depositors and 
banks to shift funds from the kinds of money 
included in M-1 B-characterized by com-
paratively low interest rates and high re-
quired reserve ratios-to higher-yielding and 
lower-reserve-absorbing categories. (A shift 
of  deposits from high-to low-reserve 
categories might  appear to increase the mu Iti-
plier, but these deposits technically become 
non-money when they leave M-1  B, wh  i  Ie the 
required reserves against these deposits re-
main in the monetary base.) In any event, 
high rates of monetary growth during the 
1970s cannot be attributed to the movements 
of the multiplier. The multiplier's decline, in 
itself and in combination with changes in the 
monetary base, would have reduced M-1 B 
by $24.7 billion in the 1970-80 decade and 
by $10.1  billion in 1980 alone. 
The monetary base, meanwhile, accounted 
for $35.4 billion of  M-l B growth in 1980, and 
for $254.3 billion of  its growth over the 1970-
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70 percent of its increase in 1980 and 87 
percent in 1970-80. In 1980, $18.5 billion of 
the $24.7-billion (controlled-factors) in-
crease was due  to the substantial reduction in 
required-reserves ratios that occurred under 
the Monetary Control Act of 1980. The bal-
ance of $6.2 billion was mainly due to Fed-
eral Reserve purchases of government sec-
urities, which increased the fiat monetary 
base. Over the 1970-80 period, reduced 
required-reserve ratios contributed only 
$15.1  billion to the (controlled factors) in-
crease in M-1 B, the remaining $206.8 billion 
resulting from increases in the fiat monetary 
base. 
Thus increases in the fiat monetary base were 
by far the most important factor responsible 
for the $204.6-billion M-1 B increase of  the 
1970-80 decade-and 94 percent of  that in-
crease resulted from Federal Reserve pur-
chases of u.s. Treasury and Federal Agency 
securities. Overall, 98 percent of 1980's 
M-1 B increase, and 109 percent of  the 1970-
80 increase, came from factors controlled by 
monetary authorities. Increases in noncon-
trolled sources of  the base thus contributed 
very little to M-1 B growth. 
Controlling the controllable 
Such observations prompt critics of u.s. 
monetary pol icy to recommend greater con-
trol over the controllable sources of the mon-
etary base, for the purpose of limiting varia-
tion ingrowth rates of  the total monetary base 
and of broader monetary aggregates such as 
M-1 B. The authorities, at least until October 
1979, apparently were influenced not only 
by the objective of  limiting variations in mon-
etary growth and inflation, but also by other 
objectives such as curbing the high interest 
rates associated with financing persistent fed-
eral budget deficits. Butthis attempt evidently 
backfired, inasmuch as the inflation that re-
su Ited from the deficits and the accelerated 
monetary growth caused interest rates to rise 
rather than fall. 
Can we avoid a repeat of  our 1970-80 experi-
ence? The answer is probably yes. Even if 
prospective federal deficits can't be 
eliminated, they can be financed mainly by 
Treasury sales of securities to private in-
vestors and foreign investors-rather than to 
the Federal Reserve. If  the Federal Reserve 
does not monetize the debt, monetary growth 
can be curbed and inflation can be brought 
Controlled and Noncontrolled Sources of Change in M-1 B 
1980  1970-80 
Billions  Percent  Billions  Percent 
of Dollars  Change  of Dollars  Change 
Change in M-1 B Due To: 
+6.2  +1.5  +206.8  +93.4 
8.5  +  +6.9 
Controlled Sources  +24.7  +6.1  +221.9  +100.3 
Noncontrolled Sources  +10.7  +2.7  +32.4  +14.7 
Monetary Base Adjusted  +35.4  +8.8  +254.3  +115.0 
-22.6 
Change in M-1 B  +25.3  +6.3  +204.6  +92.4 
Percent Due to Controlled Sources  97.6  108.5 
*Includes interaction between multiplier and monetary base adjusted. 
2 down in the United States-just  as it has been 
in other countries that have financed large 
government deficits without rapid rates of 
monetary growth and accelerating inflation. 
William G. Dewald 
(The author, Professor of Economics at Ohio 
State University, is Visiting Scholar this 
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3 BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millionsj" 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 








































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve PosItion 
Excess Reserves (  + )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  + )/Net borrowed (  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
11/18/81  11/11/81 
33  65 
16  142 
17  77 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
9,860  6.8 
11,182  9.2 
3,991  11.1 
5,521  11.1 
610  - 2.6 
791  62.9 
1,229  - 18.4 
89  - 0.6 
5,061  11.1 
4,820  - 14.8 
143  0.5 
18,018  26.4 
18,625  31.5 
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